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Abstract
The uniform distribution is an important counterexample in game
theory as many of the canonical game dynamics have been shown not
to converge to the equilibrium in certain cases. In particular none of
the canonical game dynamics converge to the uniform distribution in
a form of rock-paper-scissors where the amount an agent can lose is
more than the agent can win, despite this fact, it is the unique Nash
equilibrium. I will show that certain incentive dynamics are asymp-
totically stable at the uniform distribution when it is an incentive
equilibrium.
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Incentive dynamics [Fry12] are given by
x˙iα = ϕiα(x)− xiα
∑
β
ϕiβ(x)
where ϕ(x) is the a valid incentive for the game. It was shown that if the in-
centive for a finite game is continuous, there exists a fixed point characterized
by
ϕiα(xˆ) = xˆiα
∑
β
ϕiβ(xˆ) ∀α, i.
Notice that if this occurs at the uniform distribution, either ϕiα(xˆ) are all
zero, or they are all the same for each agent.
Nash’s original incentive function is fixed if and only if all the component
incentives are zero and thus it can only be in the first case described above.
In contrast, the incentive function given by ϕDiα(x) =
∑
γ(aαγ − ui(x))+ is
only zero when ui(x) ≥ maxγ ui(eα, eγ), where eγ ∈ S−i which can occur at
the uniform distribution only if the game is constant, which is a degenerate
case of little interest. Despite their differences we will demonstrate that the
two can agree under certain circumstances. Also, we will see that the latter
incentive is globally asymptotically stable at a uniform Nash equilibrium
where the canonical dynamics fail to converge.
0.1 A Bad Game of Rock-Paper-Scissors
The standard game of Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) is given as a two person
zero sum game with payoffs given in the table below on the left.
0, 0 −1, 1 1, −1
1, −1 0, 0 −1, 1
−1, 1 1, −1 0, 0
0, 0 −b, a a, −b
a, −b 0, 0 −b, a
−b, a a, −b 0, 0
To the right of the RPS payoffs we have a generalized RPS with a and b both
positive. The case when b > a, or an agent can lose more than it can win,
is an important example of a game. The unique Nash equilibrium for this
game is the uniform distribution. We have seen many examples of incentive
dynamics that have Nash equilibrium as their interior fixed points, such as
the replicator equations, projection dynamics, the logit equations, best reply
dynamics, and the Brown-von Neumann-Nash equations. However, in every
2
one of these cases the dynamics do not converge to the unique equilibrium
as shown in the figures below1. This leads us to the natural question: does
any incentive dynamic converge to a rest point from any initial point?
1 Agreement Among Incentives
We note the incentive ϕDiα(x) =
∑
γ(aαγ − ui(x))+ can be rewritten in the
form ϕDiα(x) =
∑
γ(ui(eα, x−i) − ui(x) + aαγ − ui(eα, x−i))+, which shows
that it is similar to a Nash comparison in that we are checking the payoff
given the other agents’ strategies are fixed. However, we are tempering that
comparison by taking away the amount by which the agent is not receiving
a preferred payoff available in the game. We will now show there is a class
of games, which includes general RPS, with the property that the uniform
distribution is a Nash equilibrium as well as an incentive equilibrium for
ϕD(x). First we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If Ai is the payoff matrix for the ith agent, then xˆ is a Nash equi-
librium where each agent is using the uniform distribution over its strategies
if and only if for each i, Ai has an equal sum across rows.
Proof. We begin by noting that for an interior Nash equilibrium we must
have
ui(e1, x−i) = . . . = ui(esi , x−i), ∀i.
It should suffice then to calculate the value of just one of the ui(eα, x−i). We
1The images were produced using the Dynamo Mathematica package developed by
Sandholm, Dokumaci, and Franchetti [SDF11]. Colors indicate speed: blue is slowest and
red is fastest
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will use the n-linearity of the payoffs to complete the task.
u1(e1, x−1) =
s2∑
j2=1
1
s2
u1(e1, ej2 , x3, . . . , xn) (1)
=
1
s2
s2∑
j2=1
u1(e1, ej2 , x3, . . . , xn) (2)
=
1
s2
1
s3
s2∑
j2=1
s3∑
j3=1
u1(e1, ej2 , ej3 , x4, . . . , xn) (3)
= . . . =
1∏
i∈N/{1} si
s2∑
j2=1
s3∑
j3=1
· · ·
sn∑
jn=1
u1(e1, ej2 , ej3 , . . . , ejn) (4)
=
s1
|S|
∑
β
u1(e1, e−1β) (5)
which is exactly the average of the coefficients in the first row of A1. Thus
for any agent i we have the equalities
si
|S|
∑
β
ui(e1, e−iβ) =
si
|S|
∑
β
ui(e2, e−iβ) = . . . =
si
|S|
∑
β
ui(esi , e−iβ)
which after cancellation of the non-zero term si|S| proves our assertion.
Proposition 2. If uniform distribution, xˆ ∈ ∆, is a Nash equilibrium and
in each of the payoff matrices the sums of the elements in each row that
are larger than the average are equal, then it is an incentive equilibrium for
ϕD(x).
Proof. We will use the above lemma to prove the assertion. Given that the
rows must all have an equal sum, the average of the elements in Ai, which
we will denote a¯i, is equal to
si
|S|
∑
β ai1β. Let us now consider the condition
for an incentive equilibrium when our incentive is given by ϕD(x). At a Nash
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equilibrium we have the following calculation for each agent i
ϕDiα(xˆ) =
∑
γ
(ui(eiα, xˆ−i)− ui(xˆ) + aαγ − ui(eiα, xˆ−i))+ (6)
=
∑
γ
(aαγ − ui(eiα, xˆ−i))+ (7)
=
∑
γ
(
aαγ − si|S|
∑
β
ui(eiα, e−iβ)
)
+
(8)
=
∑
γ
(aαγ − a¯i)+ (9)
where the second line is justified since xˆ is a Nash equilibrium and thus
ui(eiα, xˆ−i) = ui(xˆ). The last line is simply the sum of all the elements
from row α that are larger than the average. Given our assumption, it
must be the case that ϕDiα(xˆ) = ϕ
D
iβ(xˆ) for every α and β. Thus we have
ϕDiα(xˆ) =
1
si
∑
β ϕ
D
iβ(xˆ) for every agent i, which is true if and only if xˆ is an
incentive equilibrium.
To summarize, we found a class of games where the Nash equilibrium co-
incides with the incentive equilibrium for ϕD(x) at the uniform distribution.
All RPS games have the property that the rows of the payoff matrices are
permutations of the first row. Games with this property form a subset of the
games where the Nash equilibrium and our incentive equilibrium agree.
We conjecture that this is the only agreement outside of constant games
and strategies where players are receiving their respective maximum pay-
off. There are simple counterexamples when either of the conditions is
dropped. For example, if Ai =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 −3 1
, the average is 0, but the
sums across rows are not equal. The interior Nash equilibrium is xˆ =
((1/6, 1/6, 2/3), (1/6, 1/6, 2/3)) while the incentive equilibrium for ϕD is the
uniform distribution. On the other hand, if Ai =
(
1 2
3 0
)
then the Nash
equilibrium is the uniform distribution, but the incentive equilibrium is xˆ ≈
((0.31, 0.69), (0.31, 0.69)).
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2 Asymptotic Stability
As we have seen, many of the dynamics that have Nash equilibria as fixed
points do not necessarily converge to the uniform distribution. The specific
examples that do (at least so far) have been Rock-Paper-Scissors type games.
We notice that the main idea is to create a cycle of best replies by permuting
the values in the first row of the payoff matrix. This cyclic behavior is
essentially the problem with convergence. We will now show that changing
the parameters while maintaining this type of cyclic payoff structure has no
impact on the asymptotic stability of the incentive equilibrium for ϕD(x).
Proposition 3. If the rows of the payoff matrix Ai are permutations of each
other, ϕDiα(x) = ϕ
D
iβ(x) for all x ∈ ∆ and either ϕDiα(xˆ) = 0 or xˆiα = 1si for
every α at incentive equilibrium.
Proof. Denote σ as the permutation that takes row α to row β; then every
element in row β can be written as aiβγ = aiασ(k) for some k ∈ Si. Thus
ϕDiβ =
∑
γ(aiβγ − ui(x))+ =
∑
k(aiασ(k) − ui(x))+ = ϕDiα(x) regardless of x.
We can now use this fact to describe all possible incentive equilibria for
ϕD(x). By definition, at equilibrium xˆ, ϕDiα(xˆ) = xˆiα
∑
β ϕ
D
iβ(xˆ) for every
i and every α. Given that the incentive functions are all equal regardless
of x ∈ ∆, we must have ϕDiα(xˆ) = xˆiαsiϕDiα(xˆ), which is true if and only if
ϕDiα(xˆ) = 0 for all α, which can occur only at the boundary or in a degenerate
game, or when xˆiα =
1
si
for every α.
Recall the definition of an ISS is
xˆi · ϕ
D
i (x)
xi
> xi · ϕ
D
i (x)
xi
for all x 6= xˆ in some neighborhood of xˆ. Also, an ISS is asymptotically
stable wherever it satisfies the inequality in the definition. It will suffice then
to prove that the uniform distribution is an ISS and the entire space is its
basin of attraction.
Theorem 4. If xˆ is a uniform incentive equilibrium for ϕD(x) and the payoff
matrices have rows that are permutations of each other, then xˆ is globally
asymptotically stable in int∆ for the incentive dynamics.
Proof. The previous proposition gives us that the incentives are equal for all
α so we can without loss of generality use only ϕDi1(x) for each i.
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0 > − 1
si
∑
α
ϕDiα(x)
xiα
+
∑
β
ϕDiβ(x)
= −ϕ
D
i1(x)
si
∑
α
1
xiα
+ siϕ
D
i1(x)
=
ϕDi1(x)
si
[
s2i −
∑
α
1
xiα
]
If we define f(x) =
∑
α
1
xiα
it is easy to show that f(x) has a global
minimum of s2i when xi is the uniform distribution. We simply optimize
using Lagrange multipliers, noting that the Hessian matrix of f(x) is positive
definite in the interior of ∆. Thus xˆ satisfies the ISS definition for all x ∈
int∆.
We further conjecture that all interior incentive equilibrium are asymp-
totically stable. If this is true, we can reduce the open problem of finding
a game dynamic where every orbit converges to a rest point to proving that
the basins of attraction for the incentive equilibrium form a partition of ∆.
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(a) BNN (b) Logit (0.2)
(c) Smith
Figure 1: Stable limit cycles in Bad RPS
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(a) standard RPS (b) bad RPS
Figure 2: The replicator dynamics display invariant limit cycles and unstable
equilibrium points in the RPS
(a) standard RPS (b) bad RPS
Figure 3: The projection dynamics display invariant limit cycles and unstable
equilibrium points in the RPS
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(a) bad RPS (b) RPS
(c) good RPS
Figure 4: Global asymptotic stability of the uniform distribution in the si-
multaneous updating dynamics
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